Race and the Police Power:
1890 to 1937 by Epstein, Richard A.
Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 46 | Issue 4 Article 2
Fall 9-1-1989
Race and the Police Power: 1890 to 1937
Richard A. Epstein
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee University School of Law
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation




Volume 46 Fall 1989 Number 4
RACE AND THE POLICE POWER: 1890 TO 1937
RIcHARD A. EPsmiN*
I. A MoRALIy PLAY
The history of race relations between the end of the Civil War and the
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 has been the subject of intense
analysis. The narrative on the topic reads much like a modern morality
play. Its message is both powerful and compelling because one easily can
distinguish good from evil. The evil of Jim Crow and segregation in the
South was a national disgrace.' The critical decisions of the Supreme Court
that allowed the southern states (and to a lesser extent the northern ones)
to impose this regime were equally disgraceful. In 1896, Plessy v. Ferguson
2
gave full sway to the notorious separate but equal doctrine in race relations.
In Plessy Justice Harlan wrote in impassioned dissent, "In my opinion, the
judgment this day rendered will, in time, prove to be quite as pernicious
as the decision made by this tribunal in the Dred Scott case." 3 He stood
alone at the time, but history has proved him right. To be sure, Plessy did
not institute the regime of Jim Crow-that set of explicit racial restrictions
* James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, University of Chicago.
This essay is part of a longer work on the modern antidiscrimination laws, tentatively entitled:
The Antidiscrimination Laws in Employment: A Legal and Economic Analysis. I should also
like to thank both Ellyn Acker and David Lawson for their valuable research assistance in
preparing this lecture for publication.
1. The classic study is still C. VAMN WOODWARD, Tim STRANaE CAREER OF JIM CROW
(1955).
The origin of the term "Jim Crow" applied to Negroes is lost in obscurity. Thomas
D. Rice wrote a song and dance called "Jim Crow" in 1832, and the term had
become an adjective by 1838. The first example of "Jim Crow law" listed by the
Dictionary of American English is dated 1904.
Id. at 7.
2. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
3. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896).
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that governed voting, marriage, economics and schooling, and permeated
every important aspect of collective Southern life under segregation. But
Plessy did legitimate the basic structure against constitutional attack, and
thereby set the agenda that governed civil rights activity at both the national
and state level for the next 70 years. Good came only with the passage of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which marked the final, crushing blow to the
old order. The bankruptcy of Jim Crow, and the system of racial segregation
it spawned, legitimated the Civil Rights Act with far greater vividness than
any argument of moral philosophy. The statute was passed as much for
what it repudiated as for what it introduced.
The speed with which events moved in the United States in the 1960s,
however, has taken its toll on the understanding of what was wrong with
Jim Crow. Too often the dominant explanations are based on the racial
hatred which translated itself into explicit racial classifications that perme-
ated every aspect of Southern life. The response to Jim Crow was equally
clear and authoritative: Any practice, public or private, which drew dis-
tinctions between whites and blacks in social, economic or political life fell
outside the pale. Under the Civil Rights Act, the distinction between private
and government discrimination was rendered largely, if not wholly, irrele-
vant. No effort was made to relate the impact of private discrimination to
the structure of the market, to the importance of barriers to entry, to the
viability of competition or to the threat of monopoly. The antidiscrimination
principle was no longer conceived as a well-tailored antidote to the monopoly
position of the innkeeper or the common carrier, or as a check on the
power of the state to take from some and give to others. The experience
of Jim Crow was so powerful that it pushed to one side any conceptual
analysis of discrimination and its consequences in private markets. Economic
analysis, game theory and the like formed no part of the discourse. The
question of civil rights was perceived first and foremost as a moral issue,
as a question of simple justice, 4 which admitted only one categorical answer:
Any form of illicit discrimination on grounds of race was made illegal under
the statute. It was the practice of discrimination that mattered. The source
of discrimination, public or private, was wholly irrelevant.
I believe that today's common view does not understand what was
wrong with Jim Crow and segregation. The dominant evil was not self-
interest or markets, or even bigotry. The evil was excessive state power and
the pattern of private violence, intimidation and lynching, of which there
is painful record,' but against which there was no federal remedy.6 The
4. See R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION
AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (1976), for a history of the most important
desegregation decision, Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
5. See, e.g., Roback, Southern Labor Law in the Jim Crow Era: Exploitative or
Competitive, 51 U. C. L. REv. 1161 (1984), reprinted in LABOR LAW AND THE EMPLOYMENT
MARKET 217 (eds. Richard Epstein & Jeffrey Paul) 1985.
6. See, e.g., Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906), overruled, Jones v. Alfred H.
Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) with its extensive account of the private acts of violence,
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explicit discrimination in the South and elsewhere was preserved by coercion,
both by the state and by private individuals (the Ku Klux Klan) whose
activities were left unchecked by state agents. The history of failure in the
South is not a history of the failure of individual character or individual
will. It is not a history of the failure of markets. It does not demonstrate
the need for federal intervention to eradicate the "harm" that private
markets caused. Quite the opposite, the enduring lessons from our history
of Civil Rights all stem from two sources. One source is the abnegation of
the principles of limited government, that is, government action in only
those areas where government is required, such as taxation and law enforce-
ment. The second source, unrelated to the first, is the massive state legislative
regulation of private markets that was left unchecked by passive judicial
action. With Jim Crow, big government fell into the hands of the wrong
people, who were able to perpetuate their stranglehold over the local
communities and businesses by a pervasive combination of public and private
force. Jim Crow is best attacked from the limited government, libertarian
perspective. It is another illustration of how in Lord Acton's words, "Power
corrupts, and absolute power corrupts, absolutely."
The central point here can be raised by a single question. Which people
in society are the ones on whom your wealth and livelihood depends? With
the use of private force, you are forced to trade with the person whom you
fear the most. Even when peace is purchased on one front, danger lurks
on another, so that new entrants represent new perils, and not new oppor-
tunities. With markets, all individuals can gravitate towards the persons
who are most favorable to their personal goals and ambitions. You trade
with your best prospects, but not with your worst. With monopoly, trading
depends upon the preferences of the monopolist that provides the services,
constrained only by his desire to maximize profits by making sales. Within
the political context, this same question is more difficult to answer, because
legislative decisions are always a function not only of individual preferences,
but also of the way in which they are aggregated into some collective
decision. In a world devoid of constitutional restraint, the (bare) majority
rules. The issue thus becomes: Who will be able to assemble a dominant
coalition on matters of race. Here enormous leverage rests with the median
voter. 7 If it were possible (as it often is not) to array all the voters within
the jurisdiction along a single axis, the individual whose preferences are at
the median will tend to dominate the tastes of persons at either extreme.
The conclusion follows from the premise that self-interested voters will
choose the social alternative which is closest to their own private preferences.
If the only available position (or candidate), A, is not at the median, then
which fell outside the thirteenth amendment because individual acts of violence were not
tantamount to slavery as they did not involve the total "subjection" of one person to the will
of another. Id. at 17-18.
7. On matters of voting theory generally, see J. BucHANAN & 0. TuLLOCK, Tm
CALcuLus OF CoNsENT, LOGICAL FouNDATIoNs OF CONsTTunoNAL DEMOCRACY (1962).
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a new political entrant, B, who takes that position will be able to get 50
percent of the vote (those who are further from A than B, plus some
fraction of the people whose preferences lie between the two).
Consequently, as most individuals are closely bunched toward the middle
of the distribution, the median voter theorem still holds, but the problem
of collective choice becomes tractable because very few people will perceive
great differences between their first and second choices. Indeed in a world
of perfectly homogeneous preferences, politics and markets yield the same
result. 8 But there are other arrays of tastes and preferences where political
markets do far worse. Thus, suppose that the voters in a community are
divided into two hostile camps, one with 51 percent of the votes, and the
other with 49 percent of the votes. The median voter theorem suggests that
the well advised politician will cater to the tastes of the majority, inflicting
very large losses on the minority if unconstrained by constitutional princi-
ples. In addition, the situation can become very unstable if the populations
shift because of differential birth rates, immigration and migration, or (in
extreme cases) by intimidation and assassination. 9 Now the minority suddenly
can become the majority, at least if the census is retaken. It follows,
therefore, that instability may compound oppression. Markets are largely
immune to these problems. Since choices are not aggregated on an all-or-
nothing basis, two wholly separate and hostile groups are not faced with
sharply discontinuous outcomes at the median. A shift in population of 2
percent is not the difference between control and no control, between office
and exile, or between domination and oppression. It is a small difference
of two percent in wealth or market share.
This political market was not kind to the blacks, either in the south,
or nationwide. The systematic exclusion of blacks from the electorate that
shifted the voting population in favor of whites has been well documented.' 0
Within that white population, racists and bigots could, and did, outvote
more moderate whites who were willing to do business with blacks. Within
a market, however, that same majority could not bind a minority. Yet in
the political setting, the majority can bind the minority by passing laws
that require segregation, discrimination, unequal taxes and biased enforce-
ment of the laws. The South of Jim Crow must be understood as a
comprehensive network of interlocking institutions. The Supreme Court's
routine willingness, prior to 1937, to defer to political judgments of state
legislatures allowed a virulent majority to choke off the improvements that
8. Note that here are powerful comparisons between state and private organizations.
Condominiums and partnerships also work best when composed of like-minded persons. See
generally Epstein, Covenants and Constitutions, 73 CoRN. L. REv. 906 (1988).
9. See Levy, The Statistical Basis of Athenian-American Constitutional Theory, 18 J.
LEGAL STuD. 79 (1989).
10. As reflected in the Supreme Court decisions that struck down poll taxes, Harper
Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); and literacy tests, South Carolina v.
Katzenbacn, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) (sustaining Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 437 (1965),
42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982)).
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blacks and others could achieve among themselves and prevented business
transactions between blacks and whites who were sympathetic to black
interests and aspirations. The local situation was further aggravated because
the existence of hostile laws made the South a less attractive place for new
entrants from outside the region who otherwise might have made substantial
profits from doing business with local blacks. Similarly, exiting the old
system (by migration to the north) was a costly option and was blocked
further by the use of public and private force." The political process,
unconstrained by constitutional safeguards, brought on the intolerable sit-
uation of monopoly control with the wrong monopolist in control.
II. TIE POLICE POWER: PLESSY OR LOCHNER
The emergent pattern of local politics took place in a system that was,
on its face, sensitive to the risks of untrammelled popular democracy. In
large measure, the Civil War had been fought on the issues of the institution
of slavery and white dominance. The Civil War amendments-on slavery,
citizenship, voting, equal protection, due process and privileges and im-
munities-were designed to decrease the scope of state power to confer
ordinary common-aw liberties selectively on some persons while denying
them to others. The basic structure was simple and ingenious. Specific
limitations on state power that were lacking in the original constitution now
were imposed by the Civil War amendments.' 2 The enforcement of a system
of small state governments was entrusted to the federal government.
13
Government activity, in total, should have been less at all levels after the
Civil War than before, since no new and separate grants of power were
accorded the federal government beyond its power to limit state misbehavior.
Congress did pass in 1866 a civil rights statute that purported to fulfill the
mission of the Civil War amendments, but it was given narrow construction
during the Jim Crow period.' 4 The history of regulation before the 1964
Civil Rights Act shows very little direct federal intervention. History does
show a pattern of extensive state regulation in the teeth of the Civil Rights
Amendments. There is necessarily some ace in the hole. That ace in the
hole is the "police power" that came to be construed, both generally and
11. As discussed in Roback, supra note 5.
12. The key limitation on the power of the state was the contract clause, "no State shall
... pass ... any Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts" had been interpreted in Ogden
v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827), not to reach contracts not yet formed when a
statute was passed. The effect of the decision meant that only retroactive invalidation was
reached by the clause, so that there was no effective federal constitutional constraint on state
behavior. It was this pattern that was sharply reversed by the Civil War Amendments.
13. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, cl. 5 ("[t]he Congress shall have power to enforce,
by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article"). Analogous language appears in the
thirteenth amendment on slavery and the fifteenth amendment on voting.
14. See infra notes 25-33.
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in race relations, as the ability to regulate in order to achieve "safety,
health, morals and general welfare."
In order to see how the pattern unfolded, a review of some of the most
notorious Jim Crow constitutional decisions concerning the police power
from the perspective, not of a defender of the modern civil rights legislation,
but of a believer of the traditional Lockean virtues of private property,
individual liberty and limited government is instructive. What approach
should be taken to race relations if the principles of substantive due process,
as embodied in Lochner v. New York, 5 had been carried over to race
relations? Ironically, next only to Plessy, Lochner is widely regarded as the
most indefensible decision in constitutional law during years between 1870
and 1937, which are often dubbed, misleadingly in my view, the "Lochner
Era.' 6 Today Lochner is praised for its Holmes dissent with its famous
epigram, "The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spen-
cer's Social Statics."'' 7 Yet, whatever the soundness of Holmes's general
legal position, Lochner had, and has, far greater appeal on the matters of
race than on the questions of health and safety regulation that it directly
addressed. Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics is the right antidote to Jim
Crow. The nation would have been spared great anguish if Herbert Spencer's
prescriptions had been followed.
Plessy v. Ferguson, decided some eight years before Lochner, illustrates
the tension between the two approaches, one of which champions legislative
power while the other emphasizes judicial control. In 1890 Louisiana passed
a mandatory statute that provided, "all railway companies carrying passen-
gers in their coaches in this State, shall provide equal but separate accom-
modations for the white, and colored races, by providing two or more
passenger coaches for each passenger train, or by dividing the passenger
coaches by a partition so as to secure separate accommodations."'' 8 The
statute was challenged under the equal protection clause of the constitution
on the ground that the separate treatment it demanded of railroads neces-
sarily infringed the rights of individual black citizens to the equal protection
of the law. To stress the obvious, Plessy does not deal with the private
voluntary discrimination that railways might practice in their own self-
interest. Government coercion required the separation of the races.
The passage of the Louisiana statute suggests that the railway did not
practice racial discrimination in its business, and had to be coerced into
doing so by a political majority. In fact, detailed studies of the history of
15. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
16. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 567 2d ed. (1988) (noting that
description should be used "with great caution," because term "Lochnerizing" has become
an "epithet"). For criticism of Lochner, see P. MURPHY, Tm CONSTITUTION IN CIsIs TIMES
(1972). Powell, The Judiciality of Minimum Wage Legislation, 37 HARv. L. REv. 545 (1987).
I have defended Lochner in Epstein, Self-Interest and the Constitution, 37 J. LEGAL ED. 153
(1987); Epstein, The Mistakes of 1937, 11 GEORGE MASON L. REV. 5 (1988).
17. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905).
18. Louisiana Act of 1890, No. 111, p. 152.
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Jim Crow legislation in the South confirm what is evident from the statutes
themselves. 19 The railroads opposed the requirements of the statutes, resisted
their passage and may have funded the suit that Plessy (a man who claimed
to be 7/Sths white) brought to challenge the statute. To pretend that the
managers and shareholders of the railway were necessarily, or even likely,
persons of perfect virtue would be idle. Quite likely, they were ordinary
businessmen, more concerned with their financial profits than with correcting
any larger social injustices. Yet, modest characterization of their motives
explains why there is so little to fear from private discrimination. Self-
interested businessmen will be loath to practice discrimination where it hurts
the bottom line.
One word says it all: cost. Racial segregation is expensive for the firm.
The basic problem is how the railroad utilizes its capacity. Before the statute
every space was available for any passenger. Hence the railroad could be
confident that at peak hours it could fill its cars with passengers on a first
come, first serve basis. Once the statute was passed, however, the railway
necessarily lost revenue because of redundant and unused seating. Thus, if
the railway decided to operate two cars, each with a capacity of 100 persons,
it could not accommodate rush hour traffic of 120 whites and 40 blacks.
In contrast, an integrated system would allow still another 40 people to
come on board. Nor is it possible to counter the problem by using cars of
unequal size given the problem of variable proportions: on the next run the
traffic might be 40 whites and 120 blacks. To maintain different kinds of
rolling stock and to train personnel in their operation would be more
expensive.
The second alternative open to the railroad is little more appealing than
the first. Partitions do allow the separation of passengers within a car. But
partitions do not respond ideally to the problem of variable proportions,
unless the partitions can be made movable. Even then, the railroad incurs
the heavy expense of shifting the partition every time the proportion of
whites and blacks on the train changes, in order to utilize capacity that
would otherwise remain idle. With any kind of commuter railroad, this
partition shifting becomes an infeasible and unattractive alternative. The
separate but equal requirement, therefore, substantially increases those costs
of serving the market. While the rule might satisfy the demands in some
political markets, it is unlikely to satisfy them in an economic market when
the locus of power moves from the legislature to the railway owner. Even
passengers who are prejudiced against blacks easily could prefer cheap
transportation to segregated transportation if the price break is steep enough.
It is unlikely that railways could charge higher rates to blacks under a price
discrimination policy, given their lower reservation prices. So why worry?
Self-interest protects the position of a racial minority far better than a
heavy dose of republican virtue.
19. Roback, supra n.5.
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Where then does the state obtain the power to regulate the railway in
how it allocates its space? In Plessy, the challenge to the statute was
premised on the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Freedom of contract becomes the central issue when examining this clause
within a libertarian framework. Here we have a private party that wants to
sell its services to whites and blacks on identical terms. Why should the
state be able to curtail its power? Ironically, freedom of contract under the
fourteenth amendment had been constitutionalized in an earlier Louisiana
case, Allgeyer v. Louisiana,20 that dealt with the arcane mysteries of the
insurance industry. If freedom of contract works for insurance companies,
railroads should be covered as well. Presumptively, the separate but equal
statute is constitutionally infirm.
That same conclusion could be reached by the equal protection clause,
given the coercive regulation that subordinates blacks to whites. Whenever
there is state coercion, the state must justify its conduct. The police power
issue is introduced into constitutional discourse to justify state coercion.
Does the regulation fall within the "police power" of the state? It is useful
to recall the definition in Lochner:
There are, however, certain powers, existing in the sovereignty of
each State in the Union, somewhat vaguely termed police powers,
the exact description and limitation of which have not been at-
tempted by the courts. Those powers, broadly stated and without,
at present, any attempt at a more specific limitation, relate to the
safety, health, morals, and general welfare of the public.
2'
This police power, it should be stressed, is entirely a creature of judicial
implication. The two words appear nowhere in the constitution. This is not
to say that judicial implication is necessarily illegitimate. The great questions
of constitutional interpretation arise precisely because everyone concedes
that some limitation must be engrafted onto the text, although they strongly
disagree as to what that limitation should be.
The word "police" in the phrase "police power" offers one useful clue
about the scope of this power. The police can restrain the use of force by
private individuals. Their power is at the highest when they disarm a criminal
who has perfect common-law title to his gun. More generally, by the 1890s
the police power clearly extended to cover wrongful actions of all kinds
and descriptions, most notably those forms of conduct that were regarded
as nuisances, both at common law and as a matter of ordinary English.
2
The owner of a factory did not have the right to pollute his neighbor's well
or a navigable river. Where private suits to enjoin the action or to sue for
20. 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
21. 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905). See generally E. FREUND, THE POuCE POWER (1904), for
the most exhaustive contemporary account of the subject. I have given my views on the subject
in R. EPSTEIN, TAKINos: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DoMAIN, chs. 8 &
9 (1985).
22. See Northwestern Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659 (1878).
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damages were clumsy and unwieldy, a system of state regulation was an
appropriate and desired substitute. By this account, the police power is
closely tied to the ideas of tort to person and property as these ideas have
long been understood at common law.
The police power also had a second dimension, which justified antifraud
legislation. The argument is parallel to that made with respect to nuisances.
Fraud is often difficult to detect and prevent. Leaving victims of fraud to
the vagaries of private lawsuits often was tantamount to saying that there
could be no relief at all. A statute that enjoined the publication of fraudulent
information, or subjected the perpetrators of fraud to fine or punishment,
may well play a legitimate role under a libertarian model of the police
power. Prophylactic rules often are justified when case by case prosecution
is both costly and unreliable, subject always to the major dangers of
overbreadth.
These two heads of the police power leave some considerable scope to
government action on issues as diverse as environmental pollution and
securities fraud. Force and fraud are the two types of behavior against
which government should guard. The police power, therefore, is read to
conform with a coherent theory of government power, one which prevents
the police power from transforming itself by degrees into the embodiment
of the police state. Any additional head of the police power is not needed
because there are no other risks to the soundness of social life that require
the use of government coercion, at least without compensation to the parties
against whom it is used.?
So constituted, the police power does not come within a country mile
of overriding Plessy's prima facie case, whether advanced on freedom of
contract or equal protection grounds. Sitting next to another passenger on
a train is not the commission of robbery nor the creation of a common-
law nuisance. Nor does it involve deceit or fraud. The white passenger who
does not like his black neighbor (or reverse) can change his seat; he may
not force the railroad to provide separate or partitioned carriages. The
principle of freedom of contract allows the unhappy passenger not to ride
the train for good reason, bad reason or no reason at all. Even today,
businesses cannot sue prospective customers or employees that do not deal
with them on grounds of race or sex. But those tastes, however intense, do
not allow those unhappy passengers (or their favorite legislators) to remake
the railroad in their own image. Indeed, if this railroad had any monopoly
position that justified regulation, the regulation would move in exactly the
opposite direction. The railway, consistent with the common-law view, would
be under an obligation not to discriminate among its passengers unless it
23. There is a case for government intervention to control the coordination problems
that are associated with certain common pool assets, such as water and oil and gas. But here
typically there are common-law rules to ownership, through acquisition, that have to be
displaced. A well designed system that produces an extensive social surplus allows these interests
to be taken (or regulated) with compensation. See for a discussion, R. EPsTEIN, supra note
21, ch. 15 (1985).
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could show a viable cost justification. Within this libertarian framework,
Plessy is an easy case, even after the elusive police power limitation on
property and contract is taken into account.
Historically, however, the doctrinal development was far more muddled.
Even in areas having little to do with race, the police power already had
been extended far beyond the contours of the common law nuisance and
fraud. During the 1880s, for example, the Supreme Court, speaking through
the first Justice Harlan, sustained grotesque restrictions on the sale of
margarine that were not designed to prevent fraud, but to suppress com-
petition. 24 In earlier decisions the Court had expanded the police power far
beyond the point of libertarian analysis. The technique that the Court used,
in large measure, rested upon the posture of judicial deference to legislative
determinations of permissible forms of health and safety regulation. Statutes
were construed broadly where there was the tiniest risk to health and safety,
so long as the statutory language nodded weakly to some ostensible health
purpose. Anticompetitive purposes were cloaked in the transparent disguise
of police power regulations.
In order to sustain the statute, Plessy required the Supreme Court to
go one step beyond the earlier misguided precedents. While earlier cases
tolerated extravagant means directed toward the end of "safety and health,"
those cases did not expand the class of permissible ends that fell within the
police power. Plessy, however, did not refer to or discuss the earlier police
power cases, which, despite their weaknesses, were moored in their analysis
to an inflated conception of nuisance and fraud. Instead Plessy assumed
that the separation of the races by government force was an appropriate
end of the state, wholly without reference to tort, nuisance or fraud. Thus,
the Court wrote:
The object of the [fourteenth] amendment was undoubtedly to
enforce the absolute equality of the two races before the law, but
in the nature of things it could not have been intended to abolish
distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished
from political equality, or a commingling of the two races upon
terms unsatisfactory to either. Laws permitting, and even requiring,
their separation in places where they are liable to be brought into
contact do not necessarily imply the inferiority of either race to the
other, and have been generally, if not universally, recognized as
within the competency of the state legislatures in the exercise of
their police power. The most common instance of this is connected
with the establishment of separate schools for white and colored
children, which has been held to be a valid exercise of the legislative
24. See Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678 (1888) (upholding punitive regulations
against sale of margarine as "health" measure); McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27 (1904)
(sustaining 10 cent tax on yellow oleomargarine when comparable tax on butter was .25 cents).
See generally MILLER, THE MARGARINE WAR (unpublished to date) (discussion whole range of
special interest regulation designed to protect dairy industry).
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power even by courts of States where the political rights of the
colored race have been longest and most earnestly enforced. 25
The passage offers no account of the scope and limits of the police
power. It is written as though the statute was designed to protect the
principle of freedom of association (to prevent the enforced "commingling"
of the races), when its actual purpose and effect is the opposite: the statute
prevents contractual freedom between the railroad and its black and/or
white customers. As will become clear, under the standards for economic
liberties developed shortly thereafter in Lochner, the statute in Plessy would
have been doomed.
However, Plessy possibly could have relied on a different tradition that
would have allowed the Court to appeal to decisions of northern state
courts to justify itself. The critical decision in this regard was Roberts v.
City of Boston,26 which sustained the operation of a system of racially
segregated schools in Boston. The headnote to the opinion makes clear its
scope: "The general school committee of the city of Boston have power,
under the constitution and law of this commonwealth, to make provision
for the instruction of colored children, in separate schools established
exclusively for them, and to prohibit their attendance upon other schools." 27
Roberts predated the Civil War amendments, and Chief Justice Lemuel
Shaw's opinion did not use the words "police power" or invoke the doctrine
of separate but equal that grew up in their interpretation. 28 Shaw did discuss
the great principle "that by the constitutions and laws of Massachusetts,
all persons without distinction of age or sex, birth or color, origin or
condition, are equal before the law." 29 But he nonetheless concluded with
words that were seized on in Plessy, that given "the actual and various
conditions of persons in society, it will not warrant the assertion, that men
and women are legally clothed with the same civil and political powers, and
that children and adults are legally to have the same functions and be
subject to the same treatment."30 In light of these evident difficulties, Shaw
then took the line that as long as the school committee had deliberated
honestly, anxiously and in good faith, its decision could not be challenged
in court. 3' This early set of intuitions easily can be transformed into the
later pattern of constitutional adjudication. Shaw essentially adopted a view
that judicial deference was required in the oversight of difficult administra-
tive decisions. That approach fit perfectly with Plessy's view that state
officials were accorded broad deference under the police power.
25. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896).
26. 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198 (1850). It is relied upon in Plessy, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896).
27. Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198, 198 (1850).
28. For an exhaustive account of Roberts, its origins and consequences, see AlmDRw
KuLL, THE COLoR-BLuND CONSTITUTON ch. 2 & 3 (unpublished to date). The Boston schools
were desegregated by administrative action in 1855.
29. Id. at 206.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 209-10.
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Lochner, however, pointed in quite a different direction. Lochner's
doctrinal significance lay in its holding that the state's police power did not
allow the state to impose a maximum ten hour work day on certain classes
of bakers for the purported end of protecting their health. The court held
that a 10 hour limitation on employment was a "labor statute" that fell
outside the permissible ends of government regulation. While the court did
not stress the point, the beneficiaries of the statute were not the workers,
but the rival bread firms (and their unions) whose employees worked eight
hour shifts, and thus were not crimped in their operation by the statute's
passage.
32
Lochner has been condemned for its uncritical vindication of the com-
mon law. Professor Cass Sunstein has written: "In the Lochner period, for
example, the Supreme Court treated the system of market ordering, within
the constraints of the common law, as if it were prepolitical and inviolate. ' 3
3
Lochner, however, does not contain any such sweeping jurisprudential
justification of either natural or common law. Unfortunately, as valuable
as Lochner was as a limitation on government power, its protection of
private markets did not go nearly as far as Sunstein's remark suggests.
The basic point is well shown by noting that consent and assumption
of risk had a far broader role at common law than it did under Lochner's
formulation of the police power. As between consenting parties, assumption
of risk at common law had been a valid defense to any legal action for
personal injury. In that context it had received an expansive interpretation
by, among others, Oliver Wendell Holmes, 34 whose dissent in Lochner set
the stage for today's dominant deferential attitude on economic regulation.
Lochner's broad rendering of the police power that allowed it to reach all
matters of health and safety thus explicitly and consciously overrode the
common law on this critical issue. This broadening of the police power
facilitated the first wave of protective health and safety regulations of the
Progressive era. At the very time that the Supreme Court struck down the
maximum hours statute in Lochner, the Court upheld provisions of the
Federal Employer's Liability Act that explicitly prevented railroads and their
workers from contracting out of the statutory rules governing compensation
for injury. 5 Thereafter, a line of cases upheld regulation of safety in mines36
32. See Epstein, Self-Interest and the Constitution, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 153, 156 & n.6
(1987).
33. Sunstein, Legal Interferences with Private Preferences, 53 U. Cm. L. REv. 1129,
1155 (1986).
34. See Lamson v. American Axe & Tool Co., 177 Mass. 144, 58 N.E. 585 (1900). The
ironies run even deeper. The most influential early American case on the expansion of
assumption of risk to cover cases of common employment (i.e., that the worker assumes the
risks of negligence by fellow employees) was written on libertarian grounds by Shaw, C.J. in
Farwell v. Boston & Worcester R.R., 45 Mass. 49 (1842). I have commented on the decision
at length in Epstein, The Historical Origins and Economic Structure of Workers' Compensation
Laws, 16 GA. L. REv. 775 (1982).
35. See Southern Railway Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20 (1911). Section 7 of the
statute prohibits contracting out of the liability rules set by the statute.
36. Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 531 (1914).
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and workers compensation statutes,37 again on the same view of the police
power. Still other cases took a deferential view with respect to legislative
bans on the sale of milk substitutes.38 Health and safety, thus, were treated
as proper subjects of regulation.
Under Lochner only "labor" (i.e., anticompetitive) statutes were beyond
the scope of the police power. Therefore, decisions that required railroads,
for example, to bargain in good faith with majority unions were held to be
outside the police power, 39 over the dissent of Justice Holmes. Plessy did
not fall along the health/labor continuum used to organize police power
cases. Rather Plessy assumed that race relations, like health concerns, were
proper subjects of government regulation, notwithstanding their manifest
limitation on both common-law rights of contract and property. Nothing
in Plessy assumed that segregation (like markets) was a natural form of
"prepolitical" order. Quite the contrary, the whole area of racial relations
was thought to be subject to unfettered political control. The state that
imposed a requirement of equal but separate accommodations could repeal
that statute tomorrow. Plessy championed big government because it worked
for an assumption of government rectitude. Lochner stood for small (but
not small enough) government.
III. UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS: PLESSY AND BEREA COLLEGE
Thus far I have assumed that the state's case for regulation in Plessy
rested solely upon its police power. But there is a second possible way to
make the argument, which also assumed importance in the early Supreme
Court forays into race relations. In some instances, the state might assert
control over the conduct of the railroads because of its ownership of the
tracks and roads over which they travel. This line of argument was not
pressed in Plessy. Indeed, the record did not make clear who owned the
right of way over which the railroad travelled. But given the result in that
case, the point was, for the moment, irrelevant. If the state could mandate
separation of the races under its general police powers, why should it worry
about invoking its greater powers as owner or proprietor of the rails?
Nonetheless, once the general police power arguments are rejected, the
question of state ownership as a source of state power could become crucial
in theory and vital in practice: local bus companies, for example, use public
roads for their business. The state might then make this seductive argument.
Its ownership of the public highways gives it the right of any other owner,
to exclude entirely at will. If, therefore, it can keep any bus company or
trolley line off the public highways, the state can use its "lesser power" to
admit them on condition that they agree to segregate the races. The railway
or bus company has to agree to surrender the right to run its passenger
37. New York Central RR. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917).
38. The Hebe Company v. Shaw, 248 U.S..297 (1919).
39. Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
1989]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:741
business as it sees fit in order to obtain the necessary permits to use public
property.
Arguments of this sort had a certain credence at the turn of the century.
Justice Holmes, for example, championed this analogy between private and
public owners both on the Massachusetts 4° and the United States Supreme
Court. 41 It has generally been rejected, usually decisively, as a matter of
constitutional law, through the so-called doctrine of "unconstitutional con-
ditions. ' ' 42 The state, with its enormous monopoly power, does not have an
absolute freedom to contract with its citizens any more than the state has
an absolute right to regulate its citizens as it sees fit. As developed, this
doctrine provides that the state cannot demand that individuals waive their
constitutional right in order to receive some benefit from the state. In this
instance, individuals cannot be made to waive their rights of freedom of
association in order to gain use of the highways, any more than they could
be made to waive their right to vote, to speak out against the state, or to
engage in any common occupation or trade.
The appeal of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions seems almost
universal, but the doctrinal justification for its use has been far more
elusive. The case for the doctrine, however, becomes far clearer if the
doctrine is regarded, less as a defense of individuals from state coercion,
and more as a structural limitation on excessive government power. Ideally,
the object of government is to maximize the value of resources under its
command for the benefit of all its citizens. Government cannot achieve that
goal if it uses its powers to distort the preferences that would otherwise
exist in private transactions in order to satisfy the preferences of some select
group against those of the public at large. Surely, both bus companies and
blacks are better off by using the public highway subject to state regulation
than they would be if the state prohibited the companies from using the
roads at all. The proper baseline for analysis is not the status quo ante,
which presupposes that all benefits of collective state action (i.e., road
construction) are still unrealized. Rather, the correct baseline is the optimal
use of public resources in question, given the state's need to fund the
construction and maintenance of the public roads. With the conditions
imposed under the separate but equal doctrine, the total value of the roads
necessarily is reduced below what it would be with the roads built, and no
such condition attached. After all, the state imposes massive operating
inefficiencies on bus and trolley lines for which there is no offsetting social
benefit: that is the gist of the capacity problems discussed previously. This
last achievable gain is the baseline against which the state provision of
benefits should be measured, not the status quo ante. It is hardly likely
40. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
41. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1, 53 (1910) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
42. See generally Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a
Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 1293 (1984). For a more detailed statement of my views
outlined here, see Epstein, Foreword: Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power and the Limits
of Consent, 102 HA~v. L. Rav. 4 (1988).
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that the state would close down the roads to everyone to satisfy the demands
of outsiders. Also, both black and white passengers possibly would prefer
integrated carriages but not get them because of the dominance of hostile
political groups.
It is important to beware of easy analogies between individual and
collective ownership, which the absolutist position on state power glosses
over. As long as the state acts as a public trustee for all its citizens, it
cannot use its power to license in a way that secures factional benefits for
some at far lower cost than it imposes upon others. Surely, states can
require trolleys to carry insurance to answer for their torts, to comply with
certain safety requirements, or to pay their fair share of the costs of public
highway maintenance and operation. But the conditions in the licenses have
to be limited to the class of ends for which the exercise of state power is
generally relevant. Racial segregation does not aid in maintaining any
desirable form of competitive equilibrium in transportation.
43
This discussion of unconstitutional conditions is not an idle academic
diversion. If Plessy did not address the scope of the government's power
as owner of the roads, the analogous question, nonetheless, arises with
respect to state powers of incorporation. The basic rule is that all corpo-
rations can only obtain their charters, and hence the protection of limited
liability, from the state. As with the roads, the question is whether the
corporate charter can be conditioned upon the willingness of the corporation
to practice racial segregation. In Berea College v. Kentucky,4 the Court
used the expansive view of government power to squash down the remaining
opposition to Jim Crow and segregation in the south. Berea College operated
an integrated campus that offered education to black and white students
on equal terms. A 1904 Kentucky statute prohibited any individual or
corporation from operating an integrated campus at the same location and
its constitutionality was sustained by the Supreme Court. As with Plessy,
the statute in Berea College was a direct assault on freedom of contract
and association. The college cited the Lochner line of cases, so criticized
today, to the Court in an effort to strike the statute down. 45 Yet, that
argument floundered on two grounds. First, the ground that the police
power of the state was broad enough to require separation of the races, 46
a point no more valid in this context than in Plessy, was stressed (especially
in the Kentucky state proceedings). Second, the Court held that the college,
as a corporate form, was dependent for its very existence upon a grant
from the state.47 At that point the argument followed the familiar greater/
43. See Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583 (1926), discussed
in Epstein, Foreword, supra note 42, at 47-54.
44. 211 U.S. 45 (1908). The case is discussed in great detail in Schmidt, Principles and
Prejudice: The Supreme Court and Race in the Progressive Era, 82 CoLuM. L. REv. 444
(1982).
45. Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45, 49 (1908).
46. Id. at 51.
47. Id. at 53.
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lesser line. If the state could refuse to charter the corporation, then its
grant could be subject to whatever terms and conditions the state saw fit.
In practice, matters were complicated somewhat by the fact that Berea
College had received its charter long before the 1904 statute required it to
maintain separate campuses for blacks and whites. Yet here, the expansive
"implied right" (under the police power) of the state to "alter, amend or
repeal" its prior charter4 was thought sufficient to allow this regulation to
be imposed "over its own corporate creatures. ' 49 Doctrines championed
and developed to attack large corporations also could be directed toward
private integrated institutions. The Supreme Court thus sustained this ex-
ercise of government power against the college without reaching the question
of whether the state could limit the instruction of ordinary individuals under
its police power.
The argument concerning the state power to charter corporations,
however, is no more valid here than the analogous argument concerning
public roads. The state power to incorporate is not absolute, any more than
its control over the public highways is absolute. The doctrine of unconsti-
tutional conditions, invoked to limit the state powers of the roads, also has
been invoked to limit state power over the issuance of new charters. The
state may decide not to incorporate anyone at all, but once the privilege of
incorporation is allowed generally, it must be granted to anyone who does
not abuse the corporate form.5 0 The power to grant and deny incorporations
must be used to maximize the total value of the resources under private
and public hands. To give the state the power of selective incorporation
necessarily provides enormous benefits to some class of individuals, at the
expense of others, who are denied the like privilege. In order to condition
the privilege, it becomes necessary to explain how the proposed state
restriction prevents the abuse of the corporate form, much as restrictions
on highway use prevent the abuse of the public highways. A statute, for
example, that requires corporations to purchase insurance to protect tort
creditors from the risk of limited liability imposes a proper condition, much
like the condition that all users of the road agree to service of process for
accidents caused by them. A provision that requires shareholders of a
corporation to contribute funds to one political party is not a proper
condition. The "natural law" tradition, which tends to regard corporations
as voluntary associations that receive certain limited privileges from the
state (e.g., limited liability), speaks strongly against the massive assertion
of government power that was invoked in Berea College. By virtue of that
decision, state power to impose separation on the races rested not only on
the police power, but independently on the control over incorporation as
well.
The connection between Berea College and state power is revealed in
the lone dissent of Justice Harlan, who previously had dissented in Plessy.
48. Id. at 57.
49. Id. at 58.
50. See, e.g., First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
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In Berea College he saw the freedom of contract issues involved, and knew
that this case could not fall within the class of health and safety statutes.
His dissent therefore relied heavily upon the decision in Allgeyer,5' which
recognized freedom of contract in the first instance, and on Adair,12 which
struck down a federal statute that imposed collective bargaining on the
railroads and gave constitutional protection against the so-called "yellow-
dog" contract, an agreement by workers that they would not join a union
so long as they worked for the employer. Once again, the constitutional
protections for economic liberty were invoked to curtail the state regulation
of race.
The power of the Harlan dissent should be contrasted with the bankrupt
position of Justice Holmes. In 1881 in The Common Law, Holmes had
written that the life of the law was not logic but experience, but his
constitutional jurisprudence revealed quite the opposite tendency. His rejec-
tion of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions rested on the dubious
syllogism that since the state could grant or withhold corporate charters at
will, it could grant the charter on whatever terms and conditions it saw fit.
According to Holmes' view, it followed that there could be no obstacle
against tying the use of the corporate form to maintaining racially separate
instruction. As regards the power to alter or amend existing charters, he
thought such power was routinely within the police power of the state. In
effect, Holmes had committed himself to the side of government power on
the critical issues in Berea College. His legal position left him no escape.
Sandwiched between the Court's decision by Justice Brewer and the dissent
of Justice Harlan was the single line: "Mr. Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice
Moody concur in the result. ' 53
IV. COUNTERATTACK AND RETREAT: BuCHANAN OR EUCLID
In the period before the 1937 revolution, not all decisions gave away
to government power over race relations. Those decisions that prohibited
the use of government power were of two varieties. On the one hand, courts
invalidated state rules because they did not meet the minimum guarantees
of separate but equal, as when no services were provided to blacks at all.
Thus in McCabe v. Athison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway,54 the Oklahoma
statute allowed the railroads to provide separate sleeping car accommoda-
tions to both blacks and whites if the railroad so desired. But the statute
allowed the railroads to provide such accommodations to whites only if
they did not think the demand for black cars was sufficient. The Supreme
Court struck down this discriminatory act, and thereby placed a modest
crimp in the capacity of the states to discriminate. Far from assaulting the
principle of separate but equal, however, the decision only fortified the
51. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
52. Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
53. Berea College, 211 U.S. at 58.
54. 235 U.S. 151 (1914).
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principle's place within the then constitutional order, and gave defenders
of the old order a convenient way to show that the courts did not ignore
blacks who could prevail when they received no accommodations of any
sort.
The more important attack on the old regime, however, came from the
strong economic liberties and private property perspective. Buchanan v.
Warley" involved another Kentucky ordinance, regulating the sale of land.
Under the ordinance's terms, black persons were forbidden to purchase or
occupy homes in those blocks where the majority of the homes were occupied
by whites. A similar restriction against sale or occupancy by whites applied
to blocks where the majority of the residents were black. The case arose
when a black purchaser refused to take a conveyance of property given the
ordinance, which the white seller then attacked on constitutional grounds.
Under the basic logic of the separate-but-equal standard, this statute
should have been sustained, as there were no formal preferences accorded
to whites that were not accorded to blacks as well. Nonetheless, the Court
in this instance did not begin with the idea of parity but with the idea of
property and liberty. In accordance with the general analysis outlined above,
the case divides into two parts, the prima facie violation and the state's
justification under the police power. In addressing the former, the Court
found that there was a taking or deprivation of property, given the limitation
on the owner's right to sell. The definition of property used in Buchanan
was comprehensive and covered the right "to acquire, use and dispose" of
property.5 6 Those broad definitions have been compromised, if not rejected,
under the modern case law in which the "mere regulation" of the right to
dispose of property has not been regarded as a taking.
The broad definition of the property right thus forces the state to justify
its restriction. In this instance, the police power arguments all centered upon
the regulation as a means to prevent racial conflicts and to maintain racial
purity, and to prevent the deterioration of property values in mixed neigh-
borhoods. We are a long way from the control of force and fraud.
The more complex argument concerned the ostensible neutrality of the
statute. While the statute had an explicit racial classification, it was "race
neutral" in the sense that parallel restrictions were imposed upon both black
and white owners and purchasers. The effect of the ordinance, if carried
out, would have been to make blocks become either all black or all white.
Its neutrality, however, cannot be evaluated in isolation. Clearly, the dom-
inant political forces were all white, and the gradual separation of neigh-
borhoods along racial lines would allow public authorities to direct money
and services into white areas, to the systematic detriment of black ones.
The race classifications involved were far from benevolent, and had system-
atic insidious effects. In striking down the ordinance, the court had to place
limits on the police power and to distinguish both Plessy and Berea College,
55. 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
56. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 74 (1917).
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which it did. Plessy allowed blacks to have equal accommodation, and
Berea College depended upon the power of the state to alter or amend
corporate charters. But the basic point here is far simpler. The asserted
justifications of the police power are both lacking: either they address the
wrong ends: e.g., the maintenance of racial purity, which had been previ-
ously used to sustain antimiscegenation laws, 57 or they give relief far in
advance of any conceivable abuse (e.g., a nuisance) that might justify the
police power. Arrest of dangerous offenders is a better way to control
violence than to prohibit sales of homes to persons who have done no
wrong at all. As before, the success in controlling the politics of racial
domination did not require courts to override the behavior of private
individuals in markets. It was quite sufficient for the courts to protect
markets against legislative intervention.
Notwithstanding its useful contribution, Buchanan could not play a
dominant role in constraining local political forces intent upon discriminating
against blacks through public means. The decision only reached those
statutes and ordinances that contained explicit racial classifications. Buch-
anan did not reach the whole range of zoning and land use ordinances that
could limit the free disposition of land in ways that prevented the devel-
opment of low cost and effective housing for persons of all races. In a
sense, therefore, the far more important decision for race relations was
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. ,5 which on its face had nothing to do with
race at all. That decision sustained a local zoning ordinance that prevented
the construction of multiple unit dwellings on large parcels of land. A
consistent protection of economic liberties would have blunted the use of
57. See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 544. The antimiscegenation laws eventually were struck down
in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1966), where the unanimous Supreme Court held that
statute that prevented the intermarriage between white persons and persons of any other race
(with an exception for the descendants of Pocahontas) violated the equal protection clause
and the due process clause. Unlike many of the modern Supreme Court decisions on matters
of race, this case shakes out easily on Lochner-like lines. Marriage is a contract, and the police
power justifications advanced by the state are plainly worthless. See Naim v. Naim, 197 Va.
80, 87 S.E.2d 749 (1955). The analytical difficulty in the case was that a prohibition that is
equal in form to whites and blacks does not appear to offend any equal protection argument.
Professor Tribe says that Loving spoke of a "fraudulent equality." See TaraE, AmRIucAN
CoNsrnnmoTioN LAw 1480 (1988). But there was surely formal equality, and it is hard to see
why there is any disparate impact on the white and black persons who seek to marry. Why
then fraud? The fuller analysis should recognize that one can only understand the role of
equality against a background of substantive rights, here those to contract. The limitation on
the rights may have been equal for both parties to the marriage, but the critical point is that
the benefits generated were solely for strangers to the marriage contract, i.e., persons who
disapprove of such marriages. There is accordingly no police power justification, rightly
understood, nor just compensation for the persons so aggrieved. Hence the statute operates
as an unjustified interference with contractual relations. The Supreme Court had some sense
of this, for at the end of its opinion it noted that in addition to equal protection arguments,
the Virginia statute could be struck down for its interference with the "basic civil rights of
man"-a substantive and not an equality-based claim. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
58. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
1989]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:741
the zoning power in dramatic fashion and, in other areas, confined zoning
to the prevention of ordinary nuisances. Limited occasion zoning could be
used to overcome certain collective action problems, as with the placement
of signs over public streets and sidewalks. But once the broad discretion
was conferred upon local governments, statutes that facially were neutral
could be used with disparate impact upon vulnerable or unwelcome political
groups. The modern response is to try to filter out the discriminatory uses
from the legitimate ones, or to impose elaborate restrictions that require
states to subsidize housing for racial groups that had been systematically
excluded by zoning practices. 9 Yet two wrongs do not make a right; the
unwise subsidy does not cancel the unwise exclusion. It is far easier to
control government abuse by enforcing the constitutional limitations on
legislative power in the first instance.
V. A CAUTIOUS CONCLUSION
The lesson of the early race cases should be clear. The police power
exception to a wide range of constitutional protections was the vehicle that
allowed local government to trample the ordinary rights of property and
contract, which were as valuable to blacks as they were to whites. The
pattern of abuse could not be stemmed overnight even after the early
decisions were reversed. Instead, the mistakes of constitutional passivity
created a situation of near-crisis proportions to which there were no clear
answers, given the necessity to undo past wrongs while simultaneously
fashioning policy to guide future interactions. There is also cause here for
some sober reconsideration of the modern civil rights statutes, most notably
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In terms of their substance the modern civil
rights statutes are light years away from the regime imposed by Plessy. If
the choice were either/or, responsible persons could agree on only one
answer. Nonetheless, the modern civil rights statutes rest upon the same
broad conception of the police power and the same concept of legislative
deference that undergirded the earlier jurisprudence of the Supreme Court,
as the key decision in Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States"° expressly
rejected all freedom of contract arguments and extended broad deference
to the federal government in race relations. So long as Lord Acton's dictum
applies, however, there is the enormous risk that high-minded legislation
can be turned to improper and counterproductive ends. In large measure,
I believe that Civil Rights Acts work best where they are consistent with
the libertarian vision of strong private rights and limited government, and
worst where they interfere with ordinary rights to hire and fire in the market
place. Tracing down the ins and outs of the civil rights laws since 1964 is
far too daunting a task to undertake here. But the results of that study I
believe run strongly against the conventional wisdom. The dangers of abuse
59. See Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336
A.2d 713 (1975) (setting in motion a chain of litigation that still boils over today).
60. 379 U.S. 241, 258-62 (1964).
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in excessive government power remain great, even when the state seeks to
correct the mistakes of past history-errors that could have been avoided
originally if the police power had been confined to its proper scope, the
prevention and control of force and fraud.

